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Abstract 
This longitudinal study tested the veracity of one candidate multiple-deficits account of autism 
by assessing 37 children with autism (M age=67.9 months) and 31 typical children (M age=65.2 
months) on tasks tapping components of theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF), and 
central coherence (CC) at intake and again 3 years later. As a group, children with autism 
showed poor false-belief attribution, planning ability and set-shifting, together with enhanced 
local processing at both time-points. At an individual level, however, the profile was far from 
universal at either intake or follow-up. Moreover, autistic children demonstrated significant 
changes over time in ToM and EF, but not CC, over the 3-year period. The challenges these 
findings pose for a multiple-deficits account are discussed. 
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The past few decades have seen considerable research efforts devoted to isolating a single 
underlying cognitive deficit that could provide a unifying explanation for the “triad of 
impairments” in autism – the severe difficulties in reciprocal social interaction and 
communication, and restricted interests and repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 1994). Three cognitive theories in particular have dominated the field: (1) 
the theory of mind (ToM) hypothesis, which claimed that autism is caused primarily by a 
specific inability to impute mental states to oneself and to others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; see Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000, for review); (2) the executive 
dysfunction hypothesis, which proposed that the symptoms of autism are a result of a primary 
problem in the planning and execution of complex actions (Hughes & Russell, 1993; Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; see Hill, 2004, for review); and (3) “weak” central coherence (CC) 
theory, which posited that inherent to autism is an unusual tendency to focus on individual, 
local elements rather than global wholes (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006; see also Mottron & 
Burack, 2001, for a competing account). 
The notion of a single cause at the cognitive level of analysis has, however, been 
challenged on two main grounds. First, all three influential “single-deficit” models have 
struggled to satisfy key criteria for an explanatory account of autism, namely that the putative 
deficit should be “universal, specific, and necessary and sufficient to cause the symptoms of the 
disorder” (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996, p. 57), and show persistence or stability over time 
(Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Rutter, 1983) (see Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007, for review). Second, 
recent research has called into question the very premise underpinning the search for a core 
cognitive deficit: that the behaviors central to autism cluster together more often that what 
would be expected by chance as a result of shared etiology (Happé & Ronald, 2008; Happé, 
Ronald, & Plomin, 2006b; Mandy & Skuse, 2008). Investigations of the broader phenotype of 
autism have demonstrated that among those relatives of individuals with autism who display 
subclinical autistic features, the majority of these family members show behaviors in isolated 
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symptom domains (e.g., social difficulties in the absence of repetitive behaviors, etc.) rather than 
a combination of these symptoms, albeit in more subtle form than in autism itself (Bolton, 
Murphy, MacDonald, Whitlock, Pickles, & Rutter, 1994; Piven et al., 1997). Furthermore, recent 
findings from a population-based study investigating autism-related traits in over 3000 7- to 9-
year-old typically developing twin-pairs found that the cross-trait genetic correlations were 
surprisingly modest-to-low both across the general population and in children lying at the 
extreme end of the distributions, suggesting that largely independent genes may be operating on 
each aspects of the triad of impairments in autism (Ronald et al., 2006). These authors also 
showed that a considerable number of children displayed behavioral difficulties in isolation (e.g., 
social difficulties only, communication problems alone). Both sets of findings provocatively 
suggest that the triad of impairments may in fact be dissociable, raising the possibility of distinct 
causes for each aspect of the behavioral phenotype.  
In light of these challenges, Happé and colleagues have argued that “at the cognitive 
level, as at the symptom/behavioral and genetic levels, autism may be characterized by 
fractionable impairments” (Happé & Ronald, 2008, p. 296). Consequently, they have called for 
researchers to “abandon the attempt to find a single cognitive explanation” (Happé et al., 2006b, 
p. 1219) in favor of an explanation encompassing coexisting atypicalities in multiple cognitive 
domains. These authors offered one candidate account of their own in which a combination of 
cognitive atypicalities in three core domains – ToM, executive function (EF), and CC – exists in 
autism, where each atypicality underpins a distinct aspect of the behavioral phenotype (see also 
Frith, 2003; Happé & Frith, 2006). Since these atypicalities are held to be largely independent of 
each other both at the phenotypic and genetic levels, autistic symptomatology is therefore 
viewed as the result of multiple, primary cognitive atypicalities.  
Recent evidence supports this view. Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, and Maley (2006) 
found that young children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (n=40) as a group did in 
fact demonstrate the cognitive profile proposed by Happé and colleagues, including difficulties 
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in aspects of ToM (false-belief understanding) and EF (planning, cognitive flexibility) 
accompanied by weak CC (enhanced local information processing), relative to age- and ability-
matched typical children. This support at the group level was somewhat tempered, however, by 
a failure to demonstrate the presence of this specific cognitive profile in each child with ASD.  
One crucial question is how this specific cognitive profile manifests itself over time. 
Autism is generally understood as a pervasive, lifelong condition (APA, 1994), and therefore any 
putative explanation of the pathogenesis of autism should be able to account for the continuities 
and discontinuities that take place across the life span. Despite the wealth of research on 
specific cognitive skills in autism, however, there have been disappointingly few empirical 
studies tracking the development of such skills in autism – even within a single-deficit framework. 
The overarching goal of the current study therefore was to investigate longitudinally the 
multiple-deficits account proposed by Happé et al.’s (2006b) focusing specifically on questions 
regarding developmental persistence – both at the group level but also at the individual level.  
Before describing this study it is worth considering briefly the findings of the five 
existing longitudinal studies. Remarkably, only four longitudinal investigations have traced 
developmental changes in ToM. Holroyd and Baron-Cohen (1993) followed 17 of the 20 
children with autism described originally in Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) and re-assessed their 
false-belief understanding 7 years later. No overall gains in participants’ ToM skills were found: 
only three individuals passed the simple ‘Sally-Ann’ test at follow-up (including two of the four 
children who had succeeded on this task 7 years earlier), and no individual passed a more 
advanced ToM test. Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994; Expt 2) also reported no significant changes 
in the proportion of cognitively-able autistic adolescents passing and failing simple and more 
advanced ToM tasks over a 3-year period. Indeed, the scores of only 4 individuals with autism 
improved over time. The authors therefore concluded that, on the whole, ToM abilities progress 
little with development.  
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Two recent studies, however, paint a more positive picture. Steele, Joseph, and Tager-
Flusberg (2003) found significant improvements in autistic children’s ToM skills over a 1-year 
period, with initial vocabulary level, rather than chronological age, predicting a significant (yet 
small; 3%) proportion of the variance in later ToM scores. Such gains, however, were driven 
largely by improvements on tasks tapping early-emerging ToM skills (understanding of pretense 
and desire) rather than on tasks of false-belief understanding. Serra, Loth, van Geert, Hurkens, 
and Minderaa (2002) also reported significant gains in a range of ToM skills over a 6-month 
period in preschool children with a mild variant of autism (pervasive developmental disorder – 
not otherwise specified; PDD-NOS), even though children with PDD-NOS developed at a 
slower rate than younger typically developing children. Their analysis, however, examined 
changes over time for an omnibus ToM score rather than for individual ToM task scores 
rendering it unclear whether such gains occurred for false-belief understanding per se. 
To date, only two studies have investigated the developmental course of EF. In Ozonoff 
and McEvoy’s (1994; Expt 1) 3-year follow-up study, non-autistic adolescents with learning 
disability showed significant gains in planning efficiency (on the Tower of Hanoi) and made 
fewer perseverative responses (on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test [WCST]), but concomitant 
improvements were not evident in adolescents with autism. They concluded that, akin to their 
findings on ToM, difficulties in EF also persist over time. Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, and 
Rogers (1999) reported similar findings in preschoolers with autism on a spatial reversal task, a 
test of cognitive flexibility. Despite there being a trend for children with developmental delay to 
commit fewer perseverative errors at follow-up, autistic children’s performance did not change 
significantly within the space of one year.  
The findings from these longitudinal studies indicate that there are, on the whole, few 
changes in ToM or EF over time, implying that there might be a ceiling on the extent to which 
such abilities can develop in people with autism. Yet there is wide variability in the age and 
ability of participants tested within and across the five studies, which not only makes 
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comparisons between these few studies difficult, but also can potentially swamp longitudinal 
effects (i.e., improvements) within studies. Also, with the exception of Ozonoff and McEvoy’s 
(1994) study, there has been no investigation of developmental changes in multiple cognitive 
domains; it is unclear, therefore, whether all core aspects of the cognitive phenotype (cf. Happé 
et al., 2006b) take a similar developmental course. Indeed, no study has examined longitudinally 
the development of a local processing bias in children with autism, and therefore the 
progression of weak CC remains unknown.  
The limited knowledge on the developmental course of each of the three cognitive 
domains presents an initial difficulty for a multiple-deficits account of autism. A complete 
picture of the development of the condition requires an understanding of the potential changes 
that take place over time within each domain, in addition to knowledge of the factors that 
influence such changes. This longitudinal study sought to take a crucial step in this direction. To 
this end, Pellicano et al.’s (2006) samples of cognitively-able children with ASD and typically 
developing children were followed prospectively and re-evaluated three years later on similar 
measures tapping key components of ToM, EF, and CC.  
The primary aims of this study were twofold. The first aim was to test whether Happé et 
al.’s (2006b) specific cognitive profile persisted across time both at the group level and at the 
individual level. If the putative cognitive profile – difficulties in ToM and EF combined with 
weak CC – is indeed central to autism, then the group of children with autism should show 
atypicalities in ToM, EF and CC relative to a group of typically developing children both at 
intake and at follow-up (cf. Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). Furthermore, if the specific 
combination of atypicalities in ToM, EF, and weak CC underlies autistic symptoms as Happé et 
al. (2006b) proposed, then this profile should be present in all, or almost all, autistic children at 
both time points. 
The second aim of this study was to determine the nature and extent of developmental 
changes in ToM, EF, and CC, and to identify potential predictors of cognitive change. The 
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majority of existing studies has failed to demonstrate developmental improvements in false-
belief understanding and aspects of EF. It was expected, however, that longitudinal changes 
might be more readily detected in a sample of children with autism who were selected initially to 
be of at least average intellectual functioning and who fell within a restricted age range. 
Furthermore, language has been implicated in theoretical models of the development of both 
ToM (e.g., de Villiers, 2001) and EF (e.g., Russell, 1996), and has been linked empirically to 
autistic children’s skills in ToM (e.g., Happé, 1995; Steele et al., 2003), EF (e.g., Liss et al., 2001; 
Pellicano, 2007), and CC (Morgan, Maybery, & Durkin, 2003; Pellicano et al., 2006). It was 
hypothesized therefore that, for children with autism, individual differences in general cognitive 
ability, particularly verbal ability, would be influential in predicting developmental change in all 
three cognitive domains. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 90 children participated in the initial study (Time 1): 45 children with an ASD (40 
boys) and 45 typically developing children (37 boys). Briefly, all children in the ASD group had 
received an independent clinical diagnosis of either autism (n = 31), PDD-NOS (n = 12), or 
Asperger syndrome (n = 3), according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994) and met either full or 
partial criteria on the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al., 1994). These 
children were recruited via community contacts (see Pellicano et al., 2006, for details). At intake, 
the ASD group had a mean age of 67.2 months (SD = 10.51, range = 49 – 88) and the typically 
developing group had a mean age of 65.1 months (SD = 11.80, range = 48 – 88). No child had a 
coexisting medical (e.g., epilepsy) or developmental (e.g., attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder) condition as reported by parents, or obtained a verbal or nonverbal IQ score below 
80, as assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Third Edition (PPVT-III; Dunn & 
Dunn, 1997) and the Leiter International Performance Scale – Revised version (Leiter-R; Roid 
& Miller, 1997), respectively. Note that, unlike more standard IQ tests, which assess both 
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receptive and expressive language ability, the measure used here to index verbal IQ assessed 
children’s receptive vocabulary skills alone. Children with autism were recruited through early 
intervention agencies, speech and language therapists, pediatricians, and local support groups in 
the south-west region of Western Australia. The majority of children were White, and the 
parents were of mixed socioeconomic backgrounds, although specific data on socioeconomic 
status and educational attainment levels were not recorded. 
Attempts were made to contact all families approximately three years after their 
involvement in the initial study to invite them to participate in the follow-up study (Time 2). 
Sixty-eight families were re-traced and gave consent for re-assessment (76% of the original 
sample) (see Table 1). The mean time between the initial and follow-up studies was 32.9 months 
for the ASD group and 32.7 months for the typically developing group. Thirty-seven out of 45 
children with ASD (82%) were available for further testing. Of the 8 families who were 
unavailable for reassessment, 2 had relocated to a different state, while 6 families had moved 
and were untraceable. The 37 children with autism (33 boys) in the follow-up group were not 
significantly different from those who were not reassessed (n = 8) in terms of chronological age, 
F(1, 44) = .28, p = .60, verbal ability, F(1, 44) = .63, p = .43, nonverbal ability, F(1, 44) = 1.27, p 
= .27, or total algorithm score on the ADI-R, F(1, 44) = 1.90, p = .18. The follow-up group 
consisted of 26 children with autism, 9 children with PDD-NOS, and 2 children with Asperger 
syndrome, all of whom met full or partial criteria on the ADI-R conducted at Time 1 (social 
domain: M = 17.81, SD = 5.74; communication domain: M = 13.22, SD = 4.37; repetitive 
behaviors domain: M = 6.68, SD = 2.42). The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule – 
Generic (ADOS-G; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 1999) was administered at follow-up to 
index these children’s current socio-communicative symptoms (Social Interaction score: M = 
8.54, SD = 3.51; Communication score: M = 4.11, SD = 2.22; Total algorithm score: M = 12.62, 
SD = 4.98).  
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Of the initial sample of 45 typically developing children, who were recruited initially 
from several local mainstream preschools and primary schools, 31 (69%) took part in the 
follow-up study (see Table 1). One family had relocated, four families declined to participate, 
and 10 families were untraceable. The 31 typically developing children (25 boys; 81%) involved 
in the follow-up study did not differ significantly from the 14 children who did not participate in 
terms of age, F(1, 44) = .02, p = .87, verbal ability, F(1, 44) = 1.66, p = .20, or nonverbal ability, 
F(1, 44) = 1.78, p = .19, at intake. Parents of typically developing children completed the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) to ensure that no child in this 
group displayed clinically-significant levels of autistic symptomatology; all scores were well 
below the cut-off score of 15 for autism at Time 1 (M = 4.00; SD = 3.32) and Time 2 (M = 
3.50; SD = 2.85). 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Measures  
Children completed a variety of measures assessing key aspects of cognition at each time point. 
Verbal and nonverbal ability. At both time points, the PPVT-III (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) was 
used to assess children’s receptive vocabulary and four subtests of the Leiter-R (Roid & Miller, 
1997) were used to index nonverbal ability: Matching (a match-to-sample task using pictures of 
objects and abstract patterns), Associated Pairs (an associative memory task in which children 
were required to establish associations between pairs of pictured objects), Forward Memory (a 
visual short-term memory task that involved children copying the examiner’s pointing 
sequence), and Attention Sustained (a visual attention task, which entailed identifying multiple 
target stimuli amongst distractor stimuli). Standard scores are reported in Table 1, but raw 
scores are used in correlational and regression analyses since such scores have not been adjusted 
for age, and therefore are more sensitive to developmental change. 
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Theory of mind.  At each time point, children were presented with three standard false-
belief prediction tasks to index ToM ability. For the first-order unexpected-contents task (based on 
Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), children were shown 3 different boxes (e.g., milk carton) 
containing unexpected contents (e.g., rubber bands). After the lid of each box was replaced, they 
were asked to recall their own false belief (e.g., “Before you looked inside, what did you think 
was in the box?”) and to predict another’s false belief (e.g., “If I show this box to Mum, what 
will she think is inside?). Children also answered a control question (e.g., “What is in the box 
really?”) following each false belief question. For the first-order unexpected-transfer task (based on 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), children were shown six different scenarios in which one character 
either displaced or substituted another character’s object. At the end of each trial, children were 
asked a critical belief question (e.g., “Where will Sarah look for her apple?”), and two control 
questions (e.g., “What is really in the bag?” and “What was in the bag in the beginning?”). For 
the second-order unexpected-transfer task (based on Perner & Wimmer, 1985), children were shown 
two displacement scenarios similar to those in the first-order unexpected-transfer task, though 
this time they witnessed the protagonist watching the transfer through a window. For each trial, 
they were asked to attribute a mistaken belief about a belief to a character (e.g., “Where will 
Tom think that Jane will look for her book?”) as well as reality (e.g., “Where is the book 
really?”) and memory (e.g., “Where did Jane put the book in the beginning?”) control questions.  
Children were given a score of ‘1’ for each correctly answered false-belief test question. 
At both time-points, children were asked 14 test questions: 6 points from the first-order 
unexpected-contents task (3 for recalling their own belief and 3 for recalling another’s false 
belief), 6 points from the first-order unexpected-transfer task and 2 points from the second-
order unexpected-transfer task. All children correctly answered control questions, with the 
exception of one child with autism who failed the control questions on one second-order trial at 
Time 2. To avoid loss of data, this child was given a score of 0 out of 2 on this task only. 
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Executive function. At both time points, children completed two measures each tapping a 
key component of EF, including planning ability and cognitive flexibility. Both EF components 
have been identified consistently as being disrupted specifically in autism (see Hill, 2004). The 
Tower of London task (Shallice, 1982; see also Hughes, 1998b) assessed children’s higher-order 
planning ability. Children were presented with 3 colored beads (red, white, black) arranged in a 
particular configuration (start state) on a wooden tower structure consisting of 3 vertical pegs of 
increasing size (small, medium, big). They were then shown a picture of the beads in a different 
configuration (goal state) and asked to move the beads on their apparatus one-at-a-time to 
match the goal state within the least possible number of moves (this number was clearly stated 
on the picture). After three practice trials, children were given problem sets of increasing 
difficulty, including 4 trials of 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-move problems. At Time 2, an additional set of 5-
move problems was included to increase task difficulty and extend the range of possible scores. 
Testing ceased if children failed all four trials within a problem set. The number of moves taken 
and rule violations were recorded for each trial. Children were given a score of 1 for each trial if 
they reached the goal state within the minimum number of moves and without violating any 
rules (Time 1: maximum score=16; Time 2: maximum score=20). High scores indicate good 
planning ability. 
Cognitive flexibility was assessed using two developmentally-sensitive card-sorting tasks. 
Both tasks were similar in nature to the traditional WCST (Heaton, 1981), and assessed the 
ability to switch flexibly between sorting categories in response to feedback. At Time 1, 
Hughes’s (1998a) teddy-bear set-shifting task was used. There were three decks of cards, which 
differed in terms of either color (green vs. pink, blue vs. red, or yellow vs. purple), picture 
shown (hearts vs. diamonds, squares vs. moons, or stars vs. happy faces), and size of picture 
(small vs. large). To begin, children were presented with a teddy-bear and one deck of cards, and 
were told that they were to work out which cards teddy liked best. If the card was one of teddy’s 
favorites, the child posted it into a postbox. Alternatively, if the card was not one of teddy’s 
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favorites, then the child turned the card facedown on the table. Feedback was provided after 
each trial. When the child had successfully sorted six cards consecutively, or when a maximum 
of 20 trials had been presented, the sorting rule (e.g., color, shape, size) changed, upon which 
he/she was presented with a new teddy-bear and new deck of cards. Following Hughes (1998a), 
children were not alerted to a change in sorting rule; this was implicit in the fact that children 
were presented with a new situation. Set-shifting performance was rated by the proportion of 
errors committed following the first sort to criterion. 
At Time 2, children were administered a more difficult computerized set-shifting task 
(Comerford, 2005). Children were told that they would see one (target) card that appeared at the 
top of the screen, and that they would be required to match this card with one of four 
(response) cards presented at the bottom of the screen. There were 24 response cards, which 
varied on three dimensions (color, form, and background); all cards shared only one attribute 
with three out of the four response cards and no attribute with the fourth card. Each card 
therefore could be sorted according to three rules (color, form, or background). Feedback was 
provided for each trial: the words ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ would appear in centre-screen. After 
the child had sorted 6 consecutive cards correctly, the rule changed (e.g., from color to form) 
without warning. Testing continued until the set of 24 cards had been presented twice (48 trials 
in total). To ensure compatibility with the earlier set-shifting task, the main variable of interest 
was the proportion of errors committed following the first sort to criterion. For both set-
shifting tasks, a low score (i.e., minimal errors) indicates good cognitive flexibility. 
Central coherence. Two visuospatial tasks were used to assess children’s local processing 
bias: the Children’s Embedded Figures Test (CEFT) (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971) and the 
Pattern Construction task from the Differential Ability Scales (Elliott, 1990). In the CEFT, children 
initially were shown a target shape (a triangle) and asked to find this shape hidden in a number 
of larger meaningful figures as quickly as possible (total 11 trials). There was a single target 
shape per figure, and children scored one point for each correctly identified target (maximum 
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score=11). The time taken to find the target also was recorded, and was the dependent variable 
of interest. If children were unable to locate the target within 30 seconds, the maximum time 
(30 seconds) was given on that trial. Faster times are indicative of weak CC.  
In the Pattern Construction task, which is similar in nature to Wechsler’s (1999) Block 
Design subtest, children were asked to produce a number of increasingly complex patterns using 
three-dimensional blocks to match a two-dimensional design, as quickly as possible. Similar to 
the standard Block Design subtest, individual items were scored from a minimum of 0 points 
(failure) to a maximum (which varied across items), based on accurate reproduction and extra 
points for speed. Item scores were summed and then converted to ability scores using tables in 
the Manual (Elliott, 1990), which takes into account the child’s raw score and the difficulty of 
the items administered. Higher scores are indicative of better performance (i.e., weak CC).  
Individuals with autism have been shown to outperform comparison individuals on 
both tasks, and their superior performance has been attributed to an enhanced ability to pre-
segment the design into its constituent parts, which enables them to locate rapidly either the 
hidden figure (in the case of the CEFT) or the appropriate blocks from which to re-construct 
the pattern (in the case of the Pattern Construction task) (see Happé & Frith, 2006, for review). 
General procedure 
Ethical approval for the initial and follow-up studies was granted by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Western Australia, and informed written 
consent was obtained from parents of all children prior to participation. At each time point, 
children were seen individually on two occasions, each lasting approximately 1-1.5 hours, either 
at the family home or at the University. Tests of verbal and nonverbal ability were always 
administered first followed by tests of specific cognitive skills, the order of which was 
randomized across participants. 
Results 
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The first section presents preliminary descriptions of data screening and analyses on group 
matching variables. The subsequent sections present the main results for each cognitive domain 
separately, including descriptive statistics for the individual tasks, and results of analyses 
assessing developmental persistence and developmental change – two of the primary goals of 
this study. Where possible, repeated-measures ANOVAs on individual task scores, with “group” 
(ASD, typical) as the between-participants factor and “time” as the within-participants factor, 
were used to examine between-group differences and within-group change. The results of 
hierarchical regression analyses on the ASD data specifically are also reported, which served to 
identify potential predictors of change in specific cognitive skills. Aggregate scores for each 
cognitive domain were used as dependent variables. Also, to minimize the number of predictors 
in these analyses, only those early developmental variables (age, verbal ability, nonverbal ability) 
that were significantly correlated with the dependent variable were entered as potential 
predictors. The final section reports the results of analyses to determine whether the putative 
cognitive profile is characteristic of individual children with autism. 
Preliminary data screening. To begin, scores on the set-shifting tasks and the CEFT were 
reversed so that high scores reflected good performance. Subsequent data screening revealed 
that the distributions of cognitive variables met assumptions of normality, with the exception of 
scores on individual ToM tasks, which showed significant positive skew in the scores of 
children with ASD at each time-point. Transformations were applied to these ToM variables to 
try to normalize the data without success. Given the robustness of ANOVA against violations 
of normality, group differences on individual ToM tasks were analyzed using parametric tests. 
Also, and not unexpectedly, typically developing children performed at ceiling on all tests of 
false-belief understanding at Time 2. Analyses concerning development changes in ToM skills 
therefore were restricted to the ASD group. Data screening for outliers (± 3.5 SDs of the total 
sample mean) identified one extreme score on the Pattern Construction task at Time 2 (a child 
with autism). In line with Wilcox (2002), this score was trimmed by replacing it with the value 
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representing 3.5 SDs above the overall mean, and subsequent analyses were conducted using the 
trimmed score for this task (note that Table 2 displays the untrimmed scores).   
Estimates of reliability were ascertained where possible. For ToM, internal consistency 
across all 14 trials of the false-belief tasks was high for both children with ASD (Time 1: 
Cronbach’s α = .87; Time 2: α = .94) and typical children (Time 1: α = .88). Cronbach’s α could 
not be calculated for typical children’s Time 2 ToM scores since performance was at ceiling for 
this group. The CEFT (response time) showed modest reliability at both time points in the 
autism (Time 1: α = .50; Time 2: α = .51) and typical (Time 1: α = .51; Time 2: α = .47) groups. 
It was not feasible to calculate reliability estimates for the Pattern Construction task and EF 
tasks, as most of these measures incorporate stopping rules as part of their administration. High 
reliability has been reported, however, for the Pattern Construction task in preschool and 
school-age children (α ranges between .82 and .90; Elliott, 1990), and for set-shifting tasks in 
autism (Ozonoff, 1995). For each group, there were significant intercorrelations between 
individual task scores within each cognitive domain at Time 1 (ToM: rmean = .66; EF: rmean = .45; 
weak CC: rmean = .42, all ps < .05) and at Time 2 (ToM: rmean = .55; EF: rmean = .63; weak CC: rmean 
= .45, all ps < .05), indicating good convergent validity. The majority of these correlations 
remained significant when the potentially confounding effects of verbal ability and nonverbal 
ability were partialled out (all rmeans > .31).  
Group matching. Descriptive statistics for all matching variables are provided in Table 1. 
There were no significant differences between the ASD and typical groups in terms of 
chronological age, verbal IQ or nonverbal IQ at either time point (all ps > .12).  
Theory of mind 
Table 2 shows mean scores for individual tasks at each time point. As expected, at Time 
1, children with ASD obtained significantly lower scores compared with typically developing 
children on the first-order unexpected-contents, F(1, 67) = 47.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42, and 
unexpected-transfer, F(1, 67) = 9.84, p < .005, ηp
2 = .13, tasks, and the second-order 
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unexpected-transfer task, F(1, 67) = 12.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15. This pattern of group differences 
was also evident at Time 2: autistic children performed significantly worse on both first-order 
false-belief tasks (unexpected-contents task: F(1, 67) = 7.02, p < .01, ηp
2 = .10; unexpected-
transfer task, F(1, 67) = 31.23, p < .001, ηp
2 = .32), and on the second-order task, F(1, 67) = 
33.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, than typical children. 
Robust aggregate ToM scores for each time point were computed by averaging 
children’s scores from the three individual tasks (see Table 2). A repeated-measures ANOVA on 
aggregate scores showed main effects of group, F(1, 66) = 42.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39, confirming 
the results on individual task scores. There was also a significant main effect of time, F(1, 66) = 
108.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62, indicating a significant improvement in ToM scores over the 3-year 
period across groups. The interaction between time and group was not significant, F < 1, 
although this is most likely attributable to the ceiling effect present in the typically developing 
data. To ensure that the way in which the reported aggregate score was computed did not mask 
possible deficits on 2nd-order ToM tasks, two alternative ToM aggregate scores were 
constructed. One aggregate score was created by standardizing the scores from each of the three 
ToM tasks and then deriving the average, and a second score was created by averaging the 
standard scores of the 2nd-order task and the mean of the two 1st-order tasks. Subsequent 
analyses were carried out using these alternative ToM aggregate scores yet the overall pattern of 
results remained unchanged. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
To examine developmental change within individual children with ASD, the number of 
children passing and failing each ToM task at Time 1 and Time 2 is presented in Table 3. 
Success was defined conservatively as ≥ 5 out of 6 trials correct (≥ 83%) for each first-order 
task, and 2 out of 2 trials correct (100%) for the second-order task. McNemar’s tests showed a 
significant increase over time in the number of children with ASD passing the first-order 
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unexpected-contents task (16% at Time 1 and 78% at Time 2, p < .001), the first-order 
unexpected-transfer task (8% at Time 1 and 49% at Time 2), and the second-order unexpected-
transfer task (0% at Time 1 and 43% at Time 2), all ps < .001. All children who passed the first-
order ToM tasks at Time 1 also passed these same tasks at Time 2. Of the 9 children who 
passed either first-order false-belief task at Time 1, all of these children went on to pass the 
second-order false-belief task at Time 2.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
A regression analysis using aggregate ToM scores was performed to determine the early 
predictors of later ToM skills in the ASD group. Time 1 aggregate ToM scores significantly 
predicted aggregate scores at Time 2 (ß = .48, R2 = .23), F(1, 36) = 10.57, p = .003. Early verbal 
ability, r(35) = .46, p < .005), but not nonverbal ability or chronological age (both ps > .11), was 
significantly associated with later ToM skills. Early receptive-language scores therefore were 
entered into the model at the second step of the analysis to determine the additional influence, if 
any, of this variable on children’s later ToM scores. In line with a previous longitudinal study 
(Steele et al., 2003), Time 1 verbal ability explained variance in Time 2 ToM scores over and 
above Time 1 ToM (ß = .30, ∆R2 = .08), ∆F(1, 34) = 3.88, p < .05, with better vocabulary skills 
early on predictive of more advanced ToM skills 3 years later. Early ToM scores remained 
significantly predictive of children’s later ToM scores once variation in early verbal ability had 
been accounted for (ß = .36, p < .05). 
Executive function 
Children’s performance on the Tower of London and Set-shifting tasks is shown in 
Table 2. For children’s Tower of London scores, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of group, F(1, 65) = 37.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36, and time, F(1, 65) = 
125.94, p < .001, ηp
2 = .66, and a significant group x time interaction, F(1, 65) = 4.69, p < .05, 
ηp
2 = .07. Planned comparisons showed that children with ASD obtained significantly lower 
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planning scores than typical children both at Time 1, F(1, 67) = 40.48, p < .001, ηp
2 =.38, and at 
Time 2, F(1, 67) = 14.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18. Analyses further revealed that children’s scores 
improved significantly over time in both groups (ASD: t(35) = 10.80, p < .001; typical: t(30) = 
5.64, p < .001). The source of the interaction lay instead with the extent of improvements over 
the 3-year period. Children with ASD made significantly more gains (M gain = 5.06, SD = 2.81) 
than typical children (M = 3.42, SD = 3.37), F(1, 67) = 4.69, p < .05, ηp
2 = .07, on this measure 
of higher-order planning.  
How many children showed developmental improvements on the Tower of London 
task? This question was tackled by determining how many children with ASD showed 
improvements above and beyond what would be expected given their age and ability. The 
typically developing group made an average gain of 3.4 points on the Tower of London task 
during the 3-year follow-up period. The majority of children in the ASD group (n = 26; 70% of 
sample) exceeded this level of improvement (average gain of 5.0 points), compared to 12 
typically developing children (39%).  
Separate one-way ANOVAs were carried out on children’s set-shifting performance 
given the use of different tasks at different time points. Children with ASD performed 
significantly worse (i.e., made more errors) than typically developing children on the teddy-bear 
set-shifting task used at Time 1, F(1, 67) = 18.14, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22, and on the computerized 
set-shifting task administered at Time 2, F(1, 67) = 11.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .15, suggesting 
persistent difficulties with cognitive flexibility. 
The significant intercorrelations between Tower of London and Set-shifting task scores 
meant that an EF aggregate score could be computed at each time point by averaging the 
standard scores for these tasks. Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that individual 
differences in early EF aggregate scores strongly predicted ASD children’s EF performance at 
follow-up (ß = .70, R2 = .49), F(1, 35) = 33.22, p < .001. Cross-time correlations revealed that all 
developmental variables at Time 1 significantly correlated with EF aggregate scores at Time 2 
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(age: r(35) = .30, p < .05; verbal ability: r(35) = .48, p < .005; nonverbal ability: r(35) = .52, p < 
.001), and therefore all were entered into the model at Step 2. Time 1 EF aggregate scores 
continued to be significant in this model (ß = .66, p <. 005) but none of the remaining 
predictors, however, contributed any unique variance to children’s later EF skills (all ps > .42).  
Central coherence 
Table 2 shows children’s CEFT and Pattern Construction scores. An ANOVA on 
children’s CEFT times revealed significant main effects of group, F(1, 66) = 124.02, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .65, time, F(1, 66) = 36.09, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35, and a significant interaction between group 
and time, F(1, 66) = 44.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40. As expected, children with ASD showed a 
significant advantage on this task, with faster times than typically developing children both at 
Time 1, F(1, 67) = 168.29, p < .001, ηp
2 = .72, and Time 2, F(1, 67) = 10.34, p < .002, ηp
2 = .14. 
For typically developing children, the time taken to find the hidden figure reduced significantly 
over the 3-year period, t(30) = 7.49, p < .001. This was not the case, however, for children with 
ASD, whose times remained unchanged, t < 1. Comparable results were obtained when median 
times were used in analyses.    
An ANOVA on children’s Pattern Construction scores revealed main effects of group, 
F(1, 66) = 20.75, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24, time, F(1, 66) = 60.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .48, and a significant 
group x time interaction, F(1, 66) = 30.87, p < .001 ηp
2 = .32. Planned comparisons showed that 
children with ASD performed significantly better than comparison children at Time 1, F(1, 67) 
= 50.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .43, but failed to maintain their advantage on this task at Time 2, F(1, 
67) = 1.45, p = .23, ηp
2 = .02. Further within-group analyses showed that, similar to the pattern 
of results obtained for the CEFT, typically developing children’s scores improved significantly 
over time, F(1, 30) = 118.68, p < .001, η2 = .80, but ASD children’s scores did not, F(1, 36) = 
2.15, p = .15, η2 = .06. Examination of individual children’s performance over time was 
addressed in the same way as it had been for children’s Tower of London performance. While 
the ASD group improved, on average, only 4.8 points on the Pattern Construction task between 
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intake and follow up, typically developing children improved, on average, 25.8 points. Twelve 
typical children (39%) demonstrated this level of improvement compared with no child in the 
ASD group.   
CC aggregate scores for each time point were created by standardizing the CEFT time 
and Pattern Construction scores, and averaging them. Multiple regression analyses revealed that 
CC aggregate scores at intake were significantly predictive of ASD children’s scores 3 years later, 
(ß = .56, R2 = .31), F(1, 35) = 15.85, p < .001. Since Time 2 CC aggregate scores were 
significantly correlated with initial verbal ability, r(35) = .64, p < .001, and nonverbal ability, 
r(35) = .67, p < .001, but not with age (p=.10), the former two Time 1 variables were added to 
the model at the second step. Nonverbal ability alone contributed an additional 19% of the 
variance in later CC aggregate scores, (ß = .50, ∆R2 = .19), ∆F(1, 34) = 12.66, p < .001, while 
initial CC scores remained significant (ß = .32, p < .05), once variation in verbal and nonverbal 
ability had been accounted for.  
The fact that the typically developing group improved considerably on both CC 
measures might imply, paradoxically, that children develop a more pronounced local processing 
bias over time. Other factors, such as children’s maturing nonverbal and executive skills, 
however, are most likely driving this developmental change. Indeed, performance on both CC 
measures has been linked previously to concurrent verbal and nonverbal ability (Wechsler, 1999; 
Witkin et al., 1971), and early nonverbal ability (but not verbal ability) was longitudinally 
predictive of later performance on the Pattern Construction task, r(29) = .51, p < .005, and the 
CEFT, r(29) = .33, p = .06, in the current sample of typical children. Analyses also revealed a 
trend for early EF aggregate scores to be associated with later Pattern Construction 
performance, r(29) = .32, p = .07, and CEFT performance, r(29) = .30, p = .09, consistent with 
the possibility that typically developing children’s improving executive skills might enable 
children to better resist interference from the overall Gestalt and therefore rapidly locate either 
the hidden figure (in the case of the CEFT) or the blocks necessary to reconstruct the design (in 
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the case of the Pattern Construction task). Since the scores on both CC measures do not 
represent “pure” indices of local processing, the two CC variables (children’s CEFT and Pattern 
Construction scores) were regressed on nonverbal ability and EF at each time point, and the 
unstandardized residuals for each variable were saved. For each individual, these residual scores 
represent the difference between his/her observed score and what would be expected given 
his/her nonverbal and executive ability. The saved residuals for each variable were then 
converted to standard scores, and averaged to form an aggregate CC score for each time point. 
These aggregate scores were used in subsequent analyses to address the question of universality 
of enhanced local processing skills in autism. 
Multiple cognitive atypicalities at the individual level 
The results at the group level demonstrate that children with ASD do in fact display the 
cognitive profile proposed by Happé et al. (2006b), and that in general this profile persists 
across time. The next set of analyses examined whether individual children with ASD exhibited 
this profile at intake and follow-up.  
To examine the universality of cognitive atypicalities, the number of children with ASD 
that displayed an “atypicality” was calculated for each aspect of cognition using the modified t 
test developed by Crawford and Howell (1998). This one-tailed test is well-suited for comparing 
single cases to small comparison groups since it treats the statistics of the comparison sample as 
statistics rather than as population parameters, and further provides excellent control over Type 
I error rates. These authors use Sokal and Rohlf’s (1995) formula, 
 
where X1 is an individual ASD child’s score, X2 and S2 are the mean and standard deviation of 
scores from the typically developing group, and N2 is the comparison group sample size. 
Following Crawford and Howell (1998), the p value generated by each test is taken to be an 
estimate of the atypicality of an individual’s score. For example, a p value of .15 indicates the 
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proportion of the comparison group who would receive a score of similar or greater magnitude 
than the score obtained for a particular individual. For the purposes of this study, an individual’s 
aggregate score for each of the three domains was classified as “atypical” if the p value fell 
below .15. Note that this definition is functionally similar to previous definitions of an 
atypicality (Lezak, 1991; see Pellicano, 2007) in which a score is considered to be atypical if it 
exceeds 1 standard deviation above/below the mean score of the typically developing group. 
Venn diagrams illustrating the results can be found in Figure 1.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
At Time 1, 27 out of 37 children with ASD (73% of the group) scored below the cut-off 
(p < .15) on the ToM aggregate, 24 children (65%) showed an impairment in EF, and 
remarkably, all but one child (97%) displayed weak CC. How many children showed atypicalities 
in all three cognitive domains at intake (cf. Happé et al., 2006b)? More than half of the ASD group 
(59%) showed co-occurring atypicalities in ToM, EF, and CC. Five children (14%) showed poor 
ToM and weak CC, two children (5%) showed atypicalities in both EF and CC, and the 
remaining 7 children (19%) displayed weak CC alone (see Figure 1a). One additional child (3%) 
showed no atypicalities at Time 1.  
At Time 2, 26 out of 37 children with ASD (70%) fell below the cutoff on the ToM 
aggregate, 20 children (54%) showed poor EF and 18 children (49%) showed enhanced local 
processing. Only 7 children (19%) showed multiple atypicalities in ToM, EF and CC at Time 2 
(see Figure 1b). Of the remaining 30 children, a substantial portion (11 children: 30%) showed 
joint problems in ToM and EF, 6 children (16%) displayed weak CC combined with poor ToM, 
1 child (3%) showed weak CC and poor EF, 2 children (5%) showed ToM difficulties in 
isolation, 4 children (11%) showed only weak CC, and 1 child (3%) showed EF difficulties 
alone. Surprisingly, 5 children (13%) showed no cognitive atypicalities at follow-up. Of these 5 
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children, 4 had a clinical diagnosis of autism and 1 child had a diagnosis of PDD-NOS, and 4 of 
the 5 children showed sufficient behavioral symptoms at follow-up to meet the cut-off for 
autism on the ADOS-G (Lord et al., 1999). Among the 22 children who showed all three 
atypicalities at Time 1, 5 children continued to display this profile at Time 2, 11 children showed 
persistent difficulties in ToM and EF, 2 children showed atypicalities in ToM and CC, 3 children 
showed ToM problems in isolation and 1 child showed no atypicalities.  
It is possible that, among those children who failed to demonstrate atypicalities in one 
or more cognitive domains, such atypicalities were in fact present in some or all of these 
children, albeit to a lesser degree. To investigate this further, additional analyses were carried out 
using a more lenient definition of atypicality, where an individual’s aggregate score for each 
cognitive domain was identified as “atypical” if the p value fell below .50. (Note that this is a 
lenient definition of atypicality since the p value estimates the point at which 50% of the typical 
population would obtain scores lower than the score obtained for a particular individual, cf. 
Crawford & Howell, 1998.) According to the main universality analyses using the conservative 
criterion (p < .15; see Figure 1), at Time 1, 10 children showed no problems in ToM, 13 children 
demonstrated no EF difficulties, and 1 child failed to show weak CC. Subsequent analyses using 
the more lenient criterion (p < .50) revealed that all of these cases showed atypicalities in these 
domains (ToM: all cases ≤ p = .48; EF: all cases ≤ p = .43; CC: all cases ≤ p = .43). At Time 2, 
the central, more conservative analyses revealed that 11 children showed no ToM difficulties, 17 
children showed no EF problems, and 19 children failed to show weak CC. Again, when the 
more lenient criterion was applied, all children were classified as atypical on each aspect of 
cognition (ToM: all cases ≤ p = .38; EF: all cases ≤ p = .46; CC: all cases ≤ p = .45), suggesting 
that this entire sample of children with ASD appeared to show the putative cognitive profile, 
albeit in subtle form.  
Discussion 
Developmental persistence 
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Relative to age- and ability-matched typically developing children, children with ASD showed 
difficulties in false-belief understanding, problems with higher-order planning and cognitive 
flexibility together with capabilities in processing local information at both time points. This 
finding supports Happé et al.’s (2006b) claim that there is a specific profile of coexisting 
cognitive atypicalities in autism, which shows continuity with development. Yet testing the 
claims of Happé et al.’s multiple-deficits model required not only analysis of the group as a 
whole but also examination of the performance of individual children with ASD. Such analysis 
demonstrated that the putative profile was not universal at either time point, and became 
markedly less pervasive at follow-up. At intake, weaknesses in false-belief attribution and 
aspects of EF were found to be less pervasive than atypicalities in CC, resulting in just over half 
of the ASD group displaying coexisting atypicalities in all three cognitive domains. At follow-up, 
a dramatically different pattern emerged: none of the atypicalities were entirely pervasive, and 
only a minority of children displayed the complete profile. Inspection of the group means at 
Time 2 revealed that the distributions overlapped considerably, but particularly so for the weak 
CC tasks. Indeed, group differences on the CEFT were attenuated at Time 2, and had 
disappeared all together on the Pattern Construction task.  
Measurement issues might have contributed to the failure to demonstrate the 
universality of this cognitive profile in two ways. First, the Time 2 analyses on ToM were 
complicated by the presence of ceiling effects in the typically developing group, which could 
have influenced the magnitude of the group difference, and in turn, the number of individual 
children with ASD showing ToM difficulties. Even in the event that this was true, it is difficult 
to see how this explanation alone could explain the minority of children with ASD (n=7) 
showing all three atypicalities at follow-up since this ceiling effect should not have affected the 
results concerning atypicalities in EF and CC, which together accounted for less than half of the 
group. 
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Second, the cognitive measures were matched neither for discriminative power nor for 
reliability (cf. Chapman & Chapman, 1973) rendering it possible that the tasks were not 
sufficiently sensitive to detect subtle cognitive atypicalities. Internal consistency was moderate-
to-high for cognitive tasks, which remained stable across time points, and there was good 
convergent validity for each cognitive domain at intake and follow-up. Reliability was not 
evaluated for executive measures, which has been reported to be low in typical samples (e.g., 
Bishop et al., 2001) and high in autism samples (e.g., Ozonoff, 1995). The results of these 
analyses therefore should be treated with some caution.  
Despite these limitations, the fact that the majority of children failed to show multiple 
cognitive atypicalities at follow-up combined with the presence of some children who showed no 
cognitive atypicalities is problematic for Happé et al.’s (2006b) candidate multiple-deficits 
account, which attempts to provide an integrated causal explanation for the pathogenesis of 
autism. It is noteworthy that analyses using a more lenient definition of atypicality demonstrated 
that all children with ASD showed the putative cognitive profile, which is encouraging for 
Happé et al.’s account. It is worth emphasizing, however, that according to this lenient 
definition of atypicality (p<.50), one should expect to find 50% of individuals in the population 
from which the comparison sample was drawn also to receive a score of similar or greater 
magnitude than that observed for individuals with ASD (Crawford & Howell, 1998). In such 
instances, one would be cautious in classifying these typical children as showing an atypicality, 
and therefore one must be equally cautious of doing so in the case of ASD.  
Certainly, the findings from these supplementary analyses serve to highlight the 
challenges in defining atypicality, especially when examining individuals with developmental 
conditions, whose cognitive skills are unlikely to be “all or none”. Rather than ‘atypicality’ being 
conceptualized categorically, it might be beneficial to conceive of the three cognitive domains as 
dimensions located (orthogonally) within a multivariate space (Happé et al., 2006b; Happé & 
Ronald, 2008). The extent to which a person with autism shows a particular cognitive atypicality 
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therefore should vary according to the place he/she occupies on that dimension, which in turn, 
should relate directly to the degree and nature of the behavioral symptoms it purports to 
explain. This elaboration is appealing as it could potentially account for the phenotypic 
heterogeneity in autism. It would be of interest, therefore, to demonstrate empirically that 
individual differences in cognitive skills are indeed significantly related to individual differences 
in specific aspects of the behavioral phenotype – both concurrently and longitudinally. Despite 
its appeal, it nevertheless remains a challenge for this account to explain the absence of any of 
the suggested cognitive atypicalities in 4 children with ASD who have sufficient behavioral 
symptoms at follow-up. It is perhaps plausible that the emergence of cognitive atypicalities at 
some point in development could be sufficient to cause behaviors severe enough to persist 
beyond the cognitive atypicalities themselves.  
Developmental progress in autistic children’s cognitive skills 
An understanding of such putative processes necessarily demands a fuller developmental 
perspective than is currently offered. The second main finding from this study was that were 
considerable developmental improvements in autistic children’s ToM and EF, but no changes in 
local processing. Children with ASD made substantial progress in their false-belief 
understanding over the 3-year period to the extent that more than one third of the group 
succeeded on advanced false-belief tasks at follow-up. These findings present a more optimistic 
picture of autistic children’s developing ToM than earlier longitudinal studies, which reported 
negligible progress in children’s false-belief understanding (Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993; 
Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). Notably, children in these early investigations were older and less 
able than participants sampled both in the current study and in two recent longitudinal studies, 
which also demonstrated improvements in some aspects of children’s ToM skills (Serra et al., 
2002; Steele et al., 2003), highlighting the possibility that improvements, should they occur, 
might be most apparent early on during development (cf. Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-
Levi, 1998). The greater emphasis in recent years on early behavioral intervention for young 
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children with autism might also account for the greater developmental progress reported in 
more recent studies compared to earlier ones. 
Children’s planning capacity also improved significantly over the 3-year period – at a 
strikingly faster rate than that of typically developing children. These findings go against the two 
existing prospective studies on EF in autism, which reported progress in EF neither in very 
young children with autism (Griffith et al., 1999) nor in adolescents with autism (Ozonoff & 
McEvoy, 1994). Again, differences in sample selection could explain the opposing pattern of 
results since both of these studies included individuals with autism less able than the sample of 
autistic children assessed here. Interestingly, and akin to the current findings, Happé, Booth, 
Charlton, and Hughes (2006a) found that the EF performance of older participants with autism 
(M age=13 years 2 months) surpassed that of younger children (M age=9 years 2 months), 
suggestive of age-related gains in EF. Furthermore, although the authors did not find evidence 
of specific problems in planning ability, they nonetheless showed that this EF component 
showed the greatest age-related improvements in the autism group. The current longitudinal 
data strengthen Happé et al.’s (2006a) cross-sectional findings, and indicate that EF problems 
become less marked with age, at least for cognitively-able children with autism.  
Several factors might explain this boost in ASD children’s ToM and executive skills over 
the 3-year-period. The first of these is language. Regression analyses showed that verbal ability 
contributed significant variance in later ToM scores over and above variance already accounted 
for by early ToM performance. The important influence of language during children’s 
developing ToM is consistent with an abundance of cross-sectional (e.g., Fisher, Happé, & 
Dunn, 2005; Happé, 1995; Leekam & Perner, 1991) and some longitudinal (Steele et al., 2003; 
Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005) work, showing that language ability, and especially grammatical 
ability, is significantly related to autistic children’s performance on ToM tasks. Alongside these 
findings, the current data provide firm evidence that early language skills might play an 
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important role in facilitating autistic children’s understanding of the representational nature of 
mind.    
Early verbal ability was, however, unrelated to children’s developmental improvements 
in planning ability. This finding was unexpected since there are both empirical and theoretical 
reasons to anticipate a link between language and children’s developing executive skills. Russell 
(1996) argued that (internal) language ability plays a key role in executive control over action. 
Specifically, success on executive tasks, such as the Tower of London task, should be bolstered 
by the use of inner speech, i.e., if the child forms a verbal representation of the sequence of moves 
necessary to solve the problem in the minimum number of moves. Two studies have shown 
experimentally that reduced executive control in autism might indeed result from an inherent 
failure to use language to regulate and control one’s actions (Joseph, Steele, Meyer, & Tager-
Flusberg, 2005; Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006). If language is integral to success on EF 
tasks, then it is puzzling that early language skills were unrelated to developmental improvements 
on such tasks in the current study. Perhaps children’s use of compensatory strategies, which 
might be non-verbal in nature, becomes increasingly practiced over time, affording gradual gains 
in executive control. 
The second factor that could explain the enrichment in autistic children’s developing 
ToM and EF is social contact (Hughes, 1998b). Work with typically developing children shows 
that early peer interactions, particularly those involving pretence, foster the development of 
ToM (Hughes & Dunn, 1998; see Dunn, 2004, for review). Likewise, social relations are likely to 
influence children’s developing executive skills since negotiating everyday social interactions 
requires children to regulate their own behaviors (Luria, 1966, see also Hughes, 1998b). The 
majority of autistic children in the current study attended mainstream classrooms (n=34), and 
therefore encountered frequent (and varying) models of age-appropriate social interactions. 
Evidence suggests that cognitively-able children with autism seek out their non-autistic peers 
(Sigman & Ruskin, 1999). Engaging with more advanced social partners on an everyday basis 
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therefore might have bootstrapped the development of these children’s mental-state reasoning 
and executive control (Vygotsky, 1978). Indeed, increased social contact during this period of 
development might also account for the enhanced rate of acquisition of EF skills compared to 
typical children. EF shows a protracted development trajectory, which renders it especially 
susceptible to environmental influences. Recent findings suggest that EF skills are indeed 
malleable in young children (Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, & Munro, 2007). It therefore remains 
possible that attendance in mainstream schools provided an enriched social environment with 
ample opportunities for autistic children to “exercise” their EF skills, therefore boosting the rate 
of acquisition of such skills. Identifying which aspects of social relations, if any, partially mediate 
the development of children’s EF and ToM skills is a worthy line of investigation since this 
should have important implications for the remediation of atypicalities in these cognitive 
domains.  
A third reason for the improvements in EF and ToM is that the development of these 
functions is in fact inextricably linked. There is strong evidence that ToM and EF are closely 
tied in typically developing children (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes, 1998a, b) and in 
autism (e.g., Pellicano, 2007). The nature of this link, however, is controversial. Some authors 
have proposed that executive skills are a prerequisite for the later development of ToM (Moses, 
2001; Russell, 1996), while others claim that a representational understanding of mind is 
necessary for the later control of goal-directed, purposeful action (Perner & Lang, 1999). 
Further still, the parallel progression of ToM and EF might be due to a third factor: that both 
skills are mediated by adjacent structures in the pre-frontal cortex (Bishop, 1993; Ozonoff et al., 
1991). Research on the overlap between these two domains in autism is scarce yet analysis of the 
longitudinal links between EF and ToM in the current sample of children with ASD (see 
Pellicano, 2009) points towards a developmental relationship in one direction only. Earlier EF 
skills were found to be longitudinally predictive of autistic children’s later ToM test 
performance, independent of age, verbal ability, nonverbal ability, and early ToM skills but there 
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were no significant predictive relations in the opposite direction. Akin to work with typically 
developing children, these findings find favor with Russell’s account that EF plays an important 
role in the advancement of autistic children’s ToM skills (see also Pellicano, 2007). Nevertheless, 
the possibility of a functional link between EF and ToM is potentially inconsistent with Happé 
et al.’s (2006b) model, which considers the co-occurring cognitive atypicalities in autism to be 
independent and genetically distinct, and is therefore unlikely to support any notion of one 
atypicality emerging from another.  
Despite significant improvements in ToM and executive skills, children experienced no 
changes in local processing over the 3-year period. Children with ASD were no quicker to find 
the hidden figure on the CEFT than they were 3 years earlier, and their scores on the Pattern 
Construction task failed to change over time. This lack of change is in striking contrast to the 
significant gains made by typically developing children evidenced on both weak CC tasks. Could 
the lack of an improvement be explained by a ceiling effect in the ASD group? This explanation 
might account for children’s CEFT performance, but it is unlikely that a ceiling effect could 
account for children’s equally limited improvement on the Pattern Construction task since the 
majority of children’s scores were well below the maximum score.  
One alternative explanation is that the development of local processing takes strikingly 
different courses in autism and typical development. This suggestion is consistent with one 
competing account of perceptual atypicalities in autism, enhanced perceptual functioning 
(Mottron & Burack, 2001), which proposed that such peaks derive from the overdevelopment 
of basic perceptual processes, including local processing. Rather than being present from birth, 
superior local processing emerges early on during the course of development in response to 
diminished processing of higher-order operations. In line with Mottron and Burack’s (2001) 
claim, the current findings suggest these skills are early-emerging and initially accelerated in 
autism. Over time, it appears that the trajectories of children with ASD and typically developing 
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children converge as the local processing skills of typical children “catch up” to that of autistic 
children. 
The current data also highlight the possibility that the developmental trajectory of local 
processing in autism might be qualitatively distinct from the trajectories of other, higher 
cognitive domains (ToM, EF), which appear to mature later, and progress somewhat in parallel. 
Do these findings fit with Happé et al.’s (2006b) theoretical position? In its current form, the 
model says little about the ways in which these cognitive atypicalities unfold with development, 
and which sort of factors influences their progression. The possibility of distinct developmental 
trajectories for some aspects of cognition might be taken as evidence to support a fractionable 
cognitive characteristics account (Happé & Ronald, 2008). Although Happé et al. (2006b) hinted 
at the possibility of potential “interactions” between cognitive domains, the nature of any such 
interactions remains unspecified. Analysis of the current longitudinal data (see Pellicano, 2009) 
suggest that interactions do in fact exist, specifically in which early domain-general skills (EF 
and CC) play a crucial role in shaping the developmental trajectory of autistic children’s 
emerging ToM. Certainly, further elaboration of Happé et al.’s model is required to account for 
the continuities and discontinuities in the development of core cognitive skills, the specific 
developmental relationships between cognitive domains, in addition to the potential factors (e.g., 
verbal ability, social interaction; see Hughes, 1998b) that might mediate or moderate such 
development. 
Conclusion 
This is the first prospective study to investigate the development of multiple cognitive 
atypicalities in ASD. Several tasks tapping ToM, EF, and weak CC, were administered to the 
same samples of children at two different time points, separated by three years. The findings 
showed that cognitively-able children with ASD, as a group, do show coexisting atypicalities in 
important aspects of ToM, EF, and weak CC, relatively to their typically developing comparison 
children, and that this profile persists over time – precisely in the way that Happé et al. (2006b) 
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proposed. Their multiple-deficits model goes far beyond previous single-deficit models by 
invoking several core underlying atypicalities that, together, cause autism – arguably, a much 
more realistic position given the heterogeneity present in the condition. Yet not all children 
showed this particular cognitive profile. Nor did children’s cognitive skills remain static and 
unchanging. In fact, they experienced considerable gains in those aspects of cognition which 
typically present them with the most difficulty – progress which is encouraging and perhaps 
unsurprising in developing cognitive systems, but is nonetheless difficult to predict from Happé 
et al.’s model in its current form. Whether this pattern of findings will be similar for children 
with autism who have additional learning difficulties remains a crucial question for future 
research. The current findings nevertheless stress the need for theorists to take seriously the 
developing cognitive phenotype of autism.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for chronological age, verbal ability, and nonverbal ability for the autism (n=37) 
and typically developing (n=31) groups at both time points. 
 Autism Typical   
Variable M (SD) 
Range 
M (SD) 
Range 
F p 
Chronological age     
  Time 1 67.92 (10.42) 
49 – 88 
65.19 (12.64) 
48 – 88 
.95 .33 
  Time 2 100.84 (11.15) 
80 – 123 
97.94 (13.48) 
75 – 122 
.94 .34 
Verbal IQ (PPVT-III)     
  Time 1 97.08 (11.52) 
80 – 122 
100.97 (8.72) 
87 – 120 
2.38 .13 
  Time 2 93.89 (17.88) 
62 – 138 
99.64 (10.53) 
80 – 123 
2.48 .12 
Nonverbal IQ (Leiter-R)     
  Time 1 113.27 (13.93) 
83 – 141 
115.61 (16.42) 
89 – 147 
.40 .53 
  Time 2 104.35 (12.72) 
80 – 135 
106.97 (10.16) 
93 – 129 
.85 .36 
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Table 2. Mean scores for tasks tapping each cognitive domain in the autism (n=37) and typically developing 
(n=31) groups at intake and follow-up. 
 
 Group 
 Autism 
(n=37) 
Typically developing 
(n=31) 
Variable Time 1 
M (SD) 
Range 
Time 2 
M (SD) 
Range 
Time 1 
M (SD) 
Range 
Time 2 
M (SD) 
Range 
Theory of mind     
  First-order unexpected-contents    
  (out of 6) 
1.92 (2.13) 
0 – 6 
4.97 (1.99) 
0 – 6 
4.84 (1.10) 
3 – 6 
5.94 (.36) 
4 – 6 
  First-order unexpected-location       
  (out of 6) 
1.78 (1.83) 
0 – 6 
3.32 (2.62) 
0 – 6 
3.35 (2.30) 
0 – 6 
5.97 (.18) 
5 – 6 
  Second-order unexpected-location 
  (out of 2) 
.08 (.28) 
0 – 1 
1.00 (0.94) 
0 – 2 
.61 (.88) 
0 – 2 
1.94 (.25) 
1 – 2 
  Aggregate score  
  (maximum score = 4.67) 
1.26 (1.25) 
0 – 4.33 
3.10 (1.58) 
0 – 4.67 
2.94 (1.30) 
1 – 4.33 
4.61 (.17) 
4 – 4.67 
Executive Function     
   Tower of London (no. of trials  
    solved in min. no. of moves) 
6.33 (2.80)* 
2 – 13 
11.39 (3.21) 
5 – 18 
10.52 (2.67)* 
4 – 15 
13.94 (2.01) 
9 – 18 
   Set-shifting†  (prop. errors following      
    first sort to criterion) 
.32 (.07) 
.18 – .45 
.44 (.16) 
.22 – .80 
.23 (.09) 
.11 – .50 
.33 (.08) 
.20 – .48 
Central coherence     
   CEFT (score out of 11) 9.73 (1.15) 
7 – 11 
9.73 (1.02) 
7 – 11 
8.42 (1.06) 
7 – 11 
9.42 (1.23) 
6 – 11 
   CEFT (s) 5.46 (2.88) 
1.51 – 12.29 
5.79 (2.77) 
1.21 – 12.83 
14.11 (2.56) 
8.44 – 18.41 
8.04 (2.99) 
3.42 – 15.31 
   Pattern Construction 132.14 (17.64) 
108 – 182 
136.81 (20.90) 
104 – 211 
105.64 (12.08) 
75 – 131 
131.42 (13.54) 
111 – 173 
Notes:  * n=36 
     † Different tasks tapping cognitive flexibility were performed at each time point.  
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Table 3. Numbers of children with autism (n=37) passing and failing individual theory of mind tasks at 
intake (Time 1) and follow-up (Time 2).  
 
 Time 2 
Time 1 Fail Pass 
First-order unexpected-contents   
    Fail: ≤ 4 points) 8 23 
    Pass: 5 or 6 points 0 6 
First-order unexpected-transfer   
    Fail: ≤ 4 points 19 15 
    Pass: 5 or 6 points 0 3 
Second-order unexpected-transfer   
    Fail: ≤ 1 point 21 16 
    Pass: ≥ 2 points 0 0 
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Figure caption 
 
Figure 1. The overlapping circles in these Venn diagrams represent the potential combinations of 
atypicalities in ToM, EF, and CC. The region in the centre represents co-occurring atypicalities 
in all three cognitive domains: the putative cognitive phenotype of autism (cf. Happé et al., 
2006b). The numbers inside each region represent the number of children with ASD showing 
that particular atypicality alone or combination of atypicalities at (a) Time 1 and (b) Time 2.  
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